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A Scalable Robust Authentication Protocol for
Secure Vehicular Communications
Lei Zhang, Qianhong Wu, Agusti Solanas, Member, IEEE, and Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—Existing authentication protocols to secure vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) raise challenges such as certificate distribution and revocation, avoidance of computation and
communication bottlenecks, and reduction of the strong reliance
on tamper-proof devices. This paper efficiently copes with these
challenges with a decentralized group-authentication protocol in
the sense that the group is maintained by each roadside unit
(RSU) rather than by a centralized authority, as in most existing
protocols that are employing group signatures. In our proposal,
we employ each RSU to maintain and manage an on-the-fly group
within its communication range. Vehicles entering the group can
anonymously broadcast vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) messages, which
can be instantly verified by the vehicles in the same group (and
neighboring groups). Later, if the message is found to be false, a
third party can be invoked to disclose the identity of the message
originator. Our protocol efficiently exploits the specific features of
vehicular mobility, physical road limitations, and properly distributed RSUs. Our design leads to a robust VANET since, if some
RSUs occasionally collapse, only the vehicles that are driving in
those collapsed areas will be affected. Due to the numerous RSUs
sharing the load to maintain the system, performance does not
significantly degrade when more vehicles join the VANET; hence,
the system is scalable.
Index Terms—Conditional privacy, information security, protocol design, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs).

I. I NTRODUCTION

V

EHICULAR ad hoc networks (VANETs) are an instance
of mobile ad hoc networks that aim to enhance the safety
and the efficiency of road traffic. VANETs have a number of
distinguishing features and limitations that are related to the
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ment of the vehicles that are involved in those communications.
Compared with wired or other wireless networks, VANETs
are very dynamic, and their communications are volatile. In
such networks, nodes are vehicles that are equipped with
communication devices known as on-board units (OBUs), and
depending on the applications, OBUs are used to establish
communications with other vehicles or roadside units (RSUs)
such as traffic lights or traffic signs.
The specific properties of VANETs allow the development of
very attractive services such as the so-called comfort services
that include traffic information, weather information, location
of gas stations or restaurants, price information, and interactive
communication such as Internet access. Also, it is possible
to offer safety services such as emergency warnings, lanechanging assistance, intersection coordination, traffic-signviolation warnings, and road-condition warnings [1]. However,
for those new services to make life easier rather than more
difficult, they should rely on secure and privacy-preserving
protocols that encourage users to participate without fear for
their safety or personal privacy.
Consequently, security and privacy are two critical concerns
for the designers of VANETs that, if forgotten, might lead to the
deployment of vulnerable VANETs. Unless proper measures
are taken, a number of attacks could easily be conducted,
namely, message content modification, identity theft, false information generation and propagation, etc. The following are
examples of some specific attacks.
• If message integrity is not guaranteed, a malicious vehicle
could modify the content of a message that is sent by
another vehicle to affect the behavior of other vehicles.
By doing so, the malicious vehicle could obtain many
benefits while keeping its identity unknown. Moreover,
the vehicle that originally generated the message would
be made responsible for the damage caused.
• If authentication is not provided, a malicious vehicle might
impersonate an emergency vehicle to surpass speed limits
without being sanctioned.
• A malicious vehicle could report a false emergency situation to obtain better driving conditions (e.g., deserted
roads), and if nonrepudiation is not supported, it could not
be sanctioned even if discovered.
From the previous examples, it becomes apparent that message authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation are primary
requirements in VANETs. There is a need for mechanisms that
provide VANETs with security, i.e., protocols, methods, and
procedures that are able to detect whether a message has been
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modified by an attacker, determine who is the real sender of a
message, and avoid identity theft.
Besides these essential security requirements, privacy is another important issue in VANETs that cannot be forgotten. If the
importance of privacy protection measures is underestimated,
the privacy of VANET users could be endangered. For example, an eavesdropper could collect messages that are sent by
vehicles and track their locations; by doing so, the eavesdropper
could infer sensitive users’ data such as their residence and their
real identities [2]. Note that these privacy problems are similar
to the ones of location-based services (cf. [3], [4], and [42]
for further details). Nevertheless, privacy in VANETs should
be conditional, that is, user-related information such as license
plate, current speed, current position, identification number, and
the like should be kept private from other users/vehicles in
the system while authorized users (e.g., police officers) should
have access to it. Usually, the security issues of VANETs are
solved by using signature schemes that rely on a public key
infrastructure (PKI). Under the PKI solution, each vehicle has a
pair of cryptographic keys—a public key and a private key. The
private key is kept secret in the vehicle, whereas the public key
is bound to a vehicle’s identity by means of a certificate, which
is issued by a trusted authority (TA). The utilized schemes must
be efficient because, according to [5], vehicles should be able
to broadcast safety messages every 100–300 ms. Consequently,
it is much more critical for authentication to be quick to verify
than to generate.
It is easy to see that this simple PKI-based approach does not
protect users’ privacy since the broadcasting of a message (actually, a message plus the signer’s signature on the message plus
the signer’s certificate) can reveal a vehicle’s identity. Therefore, developing a suite of mechanisms to achieve security, high
efficiency, and conditional privacy preservation in VANETs is
a key research problem that we address in this paper.
A. Related Work
Due to their extraordinary commercial and social potential,
VANETs have attracted the attention of industry and academia.
In Europe, the CAR 2 CAR Communication Consortium [6] is
leading the efforts to create a European industry standard for
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication systems predicated
upon wireless local area network components. In the U.S.,
the Intelligent Transportation Systems Committee, which is
sponsored by the IEEE Vehicular Technology Society, has defined the standard for wireless access in vehicular environments
(WAVE; see [7]). WAVE is a radio communications system
that is intended to provide interoperable wireless networking services for transportation. These services include those
recognized for dedicated short-range communications (DSRC)
[8] by the U.S. National Intelligent Transportation Systems
Architecture [9].
Security and privacy issues in VANETs have recently been
studied by many researchers [10]–[12]. Blum and Eskandarian
[13] propose a secure communications architecture based on a
PKI and a virtual network controlled by cluster heads intended
to counter the so-called “intelligent collisions,” which are
collisions that are intentionally caused by malicious vehicles.
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This approach produces a remarkable overhead, and the use
of cluster heads can create bottlenecks. Gollan and Meinel
[14] propose the use of digital signatures along with Global
Positioning System technology to securely identify cars, improve the fleet management, and provide new applications for
the private and public sectors. Considering the problem from
a different point of view, Hubaux et al. [15] emphasize the
importance of privacy and secure positioning, and propose the
use of electronic license plates to identify vehicles. Although
they recognize the importance of conditional privacy, they do
not provide any specific solution to the problem.
To the best of our knowledge, there are a few articles that
consider both security and conditional privacy preservation in
VANETs. In this line, a foundational proposal is given by Raya
and Hubaux [5]. The authors use anonymous certificates to hide
the real identities of users.1 Although anonymous certificates
do not contain any publicly known relationship to the true
identities of the key holders, privacy can still be invaded by
logging the messages containing a given key and tracking the
sender until her identity is discovered (e.g., by associating her
with her residence).2 To avoid this attack, the way in which
anonymous certificates are used should be modified so that
an observer cannot track the owner of the keys. A natural
way to do so, which is proposed in [5], consists of storing a
number of anonymous certificates (as well as the corresponding
private/public key pairs) in a vehicle so that the vehicle can use
different key pairs and avert traceability. However, depending
on the key change frequency, which can vary according to the
current speed of the vehicle, vehicles will have to store a large
number of pairs. Thus, the secure distribution of keys, key
management, and storage become very complex; hence, this
type of scheme should be avoided for the sake of practicality.
With the aim to overcome the limitation of prestoring a
large number of anonymous certificates, Lin et al. [16] presented Grey Systems and Intelligent Services (GSIS), which
is a conditional privacy-preserving vehicular communications
protocol based on group signatures [17], [18] and ID-based
signatures [19]. The main advantage of using group signature
schemes is that they guarantee the unlinkability of the messages
because group members can anonymously sign on behalf of the
group. In the GSIS protocol, a single membership manager who
issues secret member keys for vehicles is used. Unfortunately,
this approach cannot effectively cope with the exclusion of
compromised vehicles from the system. The solutions proposed
by Lin et al. [16] to deal with compromised vehicles seem to
be insufficient. The first option is to update the group public
key pair for all nonrevoked vehicles. That entails a considerable overhead. The second option, which is called verifierlocal revocation (VLR), is similar to the traditional certificate
revocation list (CRL) scheme. Since the signature verification
time linearly grows with the number of revoked vehicles, the
VLR procedure becomes very time-consuming and inefficient
when the number of revoked vehicles grows.
Lu et al. [20] proposed an alternative way to overcome
the limitation of prestoring a large number of anonymous
1 Note that even when anonymous certificates are used, TAs can trace the real
identity of users.
2 This attack is possible due to the linkability “property” of the messages.
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certificates while preserving conditional privacy. They assume
that vehicles and RSUs are able to collaborate actively. Each
vehicle issues a request for a short-time anonymous certificate
from an RSU when the vehicle is passing by the RSU and
obtains an anonymous certificate after running a two-round
protocol. Since a vehicle should change the anonymous certificate quite often to avert linkability of the messages, it should
frequently interact with RSUs. Such a frequent interaction may
affect the efficiency of the VANET. This short-lived anonymous
certificate (i.e., a pseudonym) needs to be sent and forwarded
to verifiers for validating messages from the anonymous originator. It is also worth mentioning the schemes in [21] and
[22], which also rely on RSUs. In [21], the method of mix
zones is used to enhance the anonymity of vehicles. However,
this scheme still relies on preloading a large set of anonymous
certificates in each vehicle. In [22], by exploiting a keyed hash
message authentication code, a scheme with low communication overhead is proposed for secure vehicle communication.
This scheme requires a vehicle to obtain a symmetric key from
an RSU using a key agreement protocol. To protect its privacy,
the vehicle should use different public keys to communicate
with the RSUs. Hence, the vehicle still needs to preload a
certain number of anonymous certificates. As to robustness,
the schemes in [21] and [22] fully rely on RSUs. If an RSU
collapses, then these schemes will no longer work.
Recently, by using ID-based cryptography [19] to avoid
complicated certificate management, Zhang et al. [23] have
designed an efficient conditional privacy-preserving protocol
for vehicular communications. Their approach relies on tamperproof devices that are embedded in the vehicles. The system’s
master key is stored in those tamper-proof devices so that
pseudoidentities can be generated locally. Storing the system’s
master key in each vehicle may expose the system to powerful
attackers and unpredictable risks, even if the storage devices
are assumed to be tamper proof. Those expensive tamper-proof
devices can prevent attackers from reading the secrets that
are physically stored in them. However, since the system’s
master key will be involved in local computations, the attacker
has the chance to measure the energy (or time) consumed by
the computations and the emitted electronic radiation, which
contains information about the secret. With this information
and by means of statistical methods, the attacker can launch
powerful key extraction attacks such as side-channel attack
[24], [25], which are well known in cryptography. Although
the side-channel attack may be expensive to regular users, it
is attractive and practical to organized criminals since, once
the master key is extracted, they have full control over the
system.
B. Our Contribution
We observe that existing privacy-preserving protocols for
securing VANETs must face several challenges such as efficient
certificate distribution and revocation, avoidance of computation and communication bottlenecks, and reduction of the
strong dependence on tamper-proof devices. This paper addresses these challenges by exploiting the features of vehicular
mobility, road limitations, and densely distributed RSUs. We

propose a decentralized authentication protocol,3 which, unlike
the existing proposals, uses RSUs to maintain an on-the-fly
generated group within their communication range, which is
normally much longer than the V2V communication range.
Vehicles can anonymously broadcast V2V messages that can be
verified by other vehicles in the group and neighboring groups.
In our system, vehicles only request a new secret member
key when 1) they pass by an RSU for the first time or 2) when
their existing secret member keys expire. Since each vehicle
only verifies messages from vehicles that have moved into the
range of the same RSU and its neighbors, it can easily check
whether the anonymous sender was revoked with the help of
those RSUs and does not need to retrieve the revocation list
from a remote centralized authority. This greatly reduces the
certificate management overhead. Compared with the millions
of vehicles in a VANET, the number of active vehicles within a
range of a single RSU is much smaller. Hence, the system will
not suffer from computation and communication bottlenecks.
Although each party in our system needs a secret member
key, the system’s master key is only known and stored by a
centralized authority, rather than being stored in each tamperproof device that is embedded in vehicles. Furthermore, our
system is robust since, if some RSUs occasionally collapse,
only vehicles that are moving in those areas will be affected,
and our protocol can still work with slight changes. Due to the
numerous RSUs sharing the load to maintain the system, its
performance does not significantly degrade when more vehicles
join the VANET; hence, the system is scalable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II gives some preliminaries, including the network
model, the security requirements, and the concepts of signcryption, group signature, and bilinear maps. Our efficient conditional privacy-preserving protocol is explained in Section III.
In Section IV, the security of our protocol is examined. The
performance of our protocol is evaluated in Section V. Finally,
Section VI gives the conclusion.
II. P RELIMINARIES
A. Network Model
Fig. 1 illustrates the network model that will be used later.
It consists of a TA, a tracing manager (TM), RSUs, and
vehicles.
• TA: The responsibility of the TA is to issue digital certificates for vehicles and RSUs. Also, it maintains a CRL
containing the certificates of revoked vehicles. The TA is
assumed to be completely trustable, hard to compromise,
and powerful, i.e., with sufficient computation and storage
capacity.
• TM: When the content of a safety message broadcast by
a vehicle is found to be false, the TM should be able to
determine the vehicle’s real identity.
3 The protocol is still centralized in the system setup stage for enrolling vehicles. The term “decentralized authentication” refers to the group authentication
being maintained by each distributed RSU to achieve robustness and scalability,
rather than by a centralized authority, as in most existing protocols employing
group signatures.
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2) If the communication is between vehicles, privacy means
that deciding whether two different valid messages were
generated by the same vehicle is computationally hard for
everyone except the TM.
• Anonymity revocability. The TM has the ability to retrieve
the real identity of dishonest vehicles that are sending fake
messages to other vehicles to disrupt traffic.
C. Signcryption

Fig. 1.

Network model.

• RSU: RSUs are densely distributed in the roadside. In our
protocol, RSUs are used to issue secret member keys to
vehicles and assist the TM to efficiently track the real
identity of a vehicle from any safety message.
• Vehicle: Vehicles move along the roads, sharing collective
environmental information contained in safety messages
or requesting secret member keys from RSUs. OBUs are
assumed to be embedded in each vehicle. By using OBUs,
vehicles can communicate with each other as well as with
the RSUs. The communication among them is based on
the DSRC protocol.
B. Security Requirements
In this paper, we consider several security requirements [5],
[16] in two communication scenarios: 1) confidential communication between a vehicle and an RSU and 2) V2V communication. The first scenario has three security requirements:
confidential communication, message authentication, and privacy protection; the second scenario should satisfy message
authentication, privacy protection, and anonymity revocability.
The detailed descriptions of the above requirements follow.
• Confidential communication. When a vehicle communicates with an RSU, only that vehicle and that RSU are
aware of the information exchange. In our protocol, this
implies that vehicles send a request to an RSU for a secret
member key without being detected by other vehicles and
secretly receive a secret member key from the RSU.
• Message authentication. If a message has been modified
after being sent, this modification is observable by a
legitimate receiver. In addition, if the message has never
been modified, it confirms to the legitimate receiver that
the message is from a legitimate entity.
• Privacy protection. As mentioned above, privacy is an
important concern in VANETs. In this paper, we consider
the following two cases.
1) If the communication takes place between vehicles and
RSUs, privacy means that an eavesdropper cannot decide
whether two different messages come from the same
vehicle.

Our protocol uses a signcryption scheme and a group signature scheme. The signcryption scheme is used to help a vehicle
to secretly receive a secret member key from an RSU. Signcryption [26] is a public-key primitive that has the ingredients
of both digital signature and data encryption. A signcryption
scheme allows a sender to simultaneously sign and encrypt a
message. An attractive point is that it takes less computational
time and has lower message expansion rate than the sign-thenencrypt procedure [26].
The basic requirement for a signcryption scheme is that it
should satisfy the properties of message confidentiality and
signature unforgeability.
• Message confidentiality. This allows the communicating
parties to preserve the secrecy of their exchanges. This
property can be used to fulfill the confidential communication requirement in VANETs.
• Signature unforgeability. A signcryption scheme offering
nonrepudiation prevents the sender of a signcrypted message from repudiating her signature. This can fulfill the
message-authentication requirement in VANETs.
Privacy is an important concern in VANETs. The signcryption scheme should also satisfy the ciphertext anonymity
property that is defined by Boyen [27]. Ciphertext anonymity
captures the property that the ciphertext must contain no information in the clear that identifies the sender or the recipient of
the message.
• Ciphertext anonymity. A ciphertext should look anonymous to everyone but the actual recipient. The identities of
both the sender and the recipient of the ciphertext should
stay hidden from third parties. The privacy-protection
requirement in VANETs can be satisfied by this property.
The signcryption scheme in [28] is shown to satisfy message confidentiality, signature unforgeability, and ciphertext anonymity. In this paper, we employ this signcryption scheme to
help a vehicle to safely receive secret member keys from RSUs.
D. Group Signature
In our system, after receiving a secret member key from an
RSU, each vehicle can anonymously send messages on behalf
of the group maintained by this RSU by using a group signature
scheme. Group signatures [18] allow the members of a group to
sign on behalf of the group. Everyone can verify the signature
with a group public key, while no one can know the identity
of the signer except the group manager.4 Furthermore, it is
4 In case of a dispute, a designated group manager can reveal the actual
identity of the signer.
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computationally hard to decide whether two different signatures
were issued by the same member. In this paper, we employ a
group signature scheme to secure V2V communications.
Due to the security requirements of VANETs, the group
signature scheme employed should satisfy the following
properties.
• Unforgeability. Only the group members can sign messages on behalf of the group. This fulfills the message
authentication requirement in VANETs.
• Unlinkability. Deciding whether two different valid signatures were computed by the same group member is computationally hard for anyone except the group manager.
This can deal with the privacy-protection requirement in
VANETs.
• Traceability. The group manager is always able to open a
valid signature and identify the signer. In this paper, the
TM acts as the group manager, and it can use this property to address the anonymity revocability requirement in
VANETs.
E. Bilinear Maps
Recently, bilinear maps have been extensively investigated
to build efficient schemes [29]–[33]. Our protocol is also implemented with bilinear maps. Thus, we briefly review them.
Let G1 , G2 , and GT be three multiplicative groups of prime
order q. Let g1 denote a generator of G1 , g2 be a generator of
G2 , and ψ be a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 , with
ψ(g2 ) = g1 . A mapping e : G1 × G2 −→ GT is called bilinear
mapping if it satisfies the following properties.
1) Bilinearity: e(ua , v b ) = e(u, v)ab for all u ∈ G1 , v ∈ G2 ,
a, b ∈ Zq∗ .
2) Nondegeneracy: e(g1 , g2 ) = 1.
3) Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(u, v) for any u ∈ G1 , v ∈ G2 .
ψ can be a trace map as described in [31], and when G1 = G2
and g1 = g2 , ψ can be the identity map.
Computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) problem: Given
(g1a , g2b ) for unknown a, b ∈ Zq∗ , compute g1ab .
p-strong Diffie-Hellman (p-SDH) problem: The p-SDH problem in (G1 , G2 ) is defined as follows: Given a (p +
2
p
2)-tuple (g1 , g2 , g2s , g2s , . . . , g2s ) as input, output a pair
1/(s+x)
(g1
, x) where x ∈ Zq .
Decision linear problem in G1 : Given u, v, h, ua , v b , and hc ∈
G1 as input, output "yes" if a + b = c and "no" otherwise.
Our protocol employs the signcryption scheme defined in
[28] and the group-signature scheme defined in [34]. The
security of the signcryption is based on the hardness of the coCDH problem, and the security of the group-signature scheme
in [34] is based on the hardness of the p-SDH problem and the
decision linear problem.
III. ROBUST AND S CALABLE P ROTOCOL
Here, we propose a concrete robust and scalable protocol
for VANETs. This protocol employs the signcryption scheme
defined in [28] and the group signature scheme proposed in
[34] as building blocks. The signcryption scheme is used to

Fig. 2.

Basic ideas in the decentralized protocol.

help a vehicle to secretly obtain a secret member key from
an RSU, and the group signature scheme is used for V2V
communications.
A. Basic Ideas
Here, we outline the basic ideas in our decentralized privacypreserving authentication protocol to secure vehicular communications. Fig. 2 illustrates those basic ideas.
In our system, we let each RSU maintain an on-the-fly
generated group consisting of vehicles that occasionally enter
the RSU’s communication range. The RSU will periodically
broadcast its own certificate and its neighbor RSUs’ certificates
to the vehicles within its range. When a vehicle V passes
by an RSU, if it is the first time it sees this RSU or if the
vehicle’s current secret member key has expired, the vehicle
V and the RSU will run a KeyRequest protocol. V sends a
signcrypted message ρ to the RSU to request a secret member
key. When the RSU receives the request, first, it de-signcrypts
the message ρ to obtain the plaintext m (which includes a
session key, a timestamp, the certificate of V , and a signature)
and checks whether V is entitled to obtain a secret member
key (i.e., an anonymous group certificate), according to certain
security policies to be detailed in specific implementations. If
V satisfies the security criteria, a secure channel between V
and the RSU will be opened, and a secret member key that
is generated by the RSU will be sent back to the vehicle V
through the secure channel. After receiving the secret member
key, V can anonymously sign with a group signature scheme
any V2V messages during its stay within the range of the RSU.
These signed messages can be verified by other vehicles in the
areas that are covered by the current and neighboring RSUs.
Most messages are about regular driving status information and
do not need to be forwarded. In case of important messages,
after verifying them, vehicles can sign again and forward them
to other vehicles in the areas covered by the current RSU
and its neighbors. This will allow important messages to be
disseminated to the whole VANET.
As claimed in Section I-B, this local processing of messages
by the RSUs within the range results in increased efficiency and
robustness. As to efficiency, since each vehicle only verifies
messages from vehicles that move into the range of the same
RSU and its neighbors, it can easily check whether the anonymous sender was revoked with the help of the neighboring
RSUs and does not need to retrieve the revocation list from
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TABLE I
F ORMAT OF A S AFETY M ESSAGE : F IELDS AND L ENGTHS

Fig. 3.

Collapsed RSU 2.

a remote centralized authority. Regarding robustness, if some
RSUs collapse, only vehicles entering the areas of those RSUs
will be affected, and our protocol can still work with slight
changes. For instance, as shown in Fig. 3, assume that vehicle
V has obtained the secret member key from RSU 1 and that it
is now in the cover range of RSU 2, which has collapsed. In
this case, V can still use the secret member key from RSU 1
to sign the messages before it can join the group maintained by
RSU 3, and RSU 1/3 only needs to broadcast a notification and
the certificates of RSU 3/1 in its area as well. This mechanism
may slightly decrease the security of the VANET in the case
that a vehicle cannot get the up-to-date certificates of nearby
RSUs (this problem can be alleviated by requesting the updated
certificates from other vehicles using a multihop mechanism).
We note that, in the early stages of VANET deployment,
RSUs may not be densely distributed. They are more likely to
be deployed in metropolitan areas that suffer from heavy traffic.
It seems reasonable to assume that there will be some sporadic
RSUs in the early stage of VANETs, although the density of
RSUs might not be very high. In this case, a measure that is
similar to that in the above paragraph can be used to alleviate
the dependence of RSUs. Finally, if the density of vehicles in
an area is extremely low, similarly to the centralized group
signature-based protocol in [16], our protocol can also be used
as a centralized authentication scheme.
B. Concrete Protocol
Here, we describe our robust and scalable protocol for secure
vehicular communication in detail. Our protocol consists of
five stages: system setup, key issuance, re-key issuance, signing,
batch verification, and tracing.
Before describing our protocol, we first explain the notation
that is used to simplify the description.
TA
viewed as an electronic counterpart of
the traffic administration office in the real
world. The TA owns the system’s master
key, which is used to issue digital certificates for vehicles and RSUs. It also maintains a CRL, which contains the certificates
of the revoked vehicles;
TM
instantiated by the traffic police. It is able
to trace the identity of a vehicle having
generated a certain safety message;
ith RSU. The responsibility of an RSU in
Ri
our protocol is to issue secret member keys
for vehicles;
ith vehicle;
Vi
identity of Vi ;
IDVi

TP
CertRi
CertVi
EK (·)/DK (·)

timestamp;
certificate of Ri ;
certificate of Vi ;
encryption/decryption algorithm of a symmetric key encryption scheme, where K is
a key that specifies the particular transformation of plaintext into ciphertext during
encryption, or vice versa during decryption;
SK
session key that will be used as the key of
EK (·)/DK (·);

message concatenation operation;
SM
safety message. The format of a safety message that is sent by a vehicle is shown in
Table I.
The group ID is used to identify to which group a vehicle
belongs, and its length is 2 B. Position, current time, direction,
speed, acceleration/deceleration, traffic events, etc., of a vehicle
are included in the message payload. According to [35], the
length of a payload is 100 B. We add the timestamp into a safety
message to prevent the message replay attack. The last field
is the signature of the first three parts of the safety message.
The length of a signature in our protocol is 368 B (we will
elaborate on that later). Therefore, the total message length is
474 B.
Now, we describe the system setup, key issuance, re-key
issue, signing, batch verification, and tracing stages of our
protocol in detail.
1) System Setup: At this stage, the TA generates the parameters for the whole system by using the TAKeyGen algorithm.
Using the TMKeyGen algorithm, the TM generates its private
and public keys. Similarly, each RSU or vehicle generates its
private and public keys by using RKeyGen or VKeyGen.
• TAKeyGen: TA proceeds as follows.
1) Select G1 , G2 , g1 , g2 , ψ, e.
2) Choose cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ −→
G1 , H2 : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}f , H3 : {0, 1}∗ −→ Zq∗ ,
and EK (·)/DK (·).
3) Publish the system parameters as params = (G1 , G2 ,
g1 , g2 , ψ, e, H1 ∼ H3 , EK (·)/DK (·)), where f is the
total length of the messages to be signcrypted. params
are prestored in the TM and in each Ri , Vi .
• TMKeyGen: Randomly select h ∈ G∗1 , x, y ∈ Zq∗ , and set
u, v ∈ G1 such that ux = v y = h. The TM’s public key is
gT M = (h, u, v). The private key of TM is sT M = (x, y).
TM’s public key is prestored in each Ri , Vi .
• RKeyGen: Select ζi ∈ Zq∗ at random, and compute wi =
g2ζi . The private/public keys of an RSU Ri are ζi /wi , and
the corresponding certificate of Ri is CertRi .
• VKeyGen: Choose a random ξi ∈ Zq∗ , and compute
pkVi = g2ξi . The vehicle Vi ’s private/public keys are
ξi /pkVi , whereas CertVi is the Vi ’s certificate.

1612

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 59, NO. 4, MAY 2010

Note that the certificates of vehicles and RSUs are issued by
the TA.
2) Key Issuance: In this stage, a vehicle joins a group that is
maintained by an RSU. An RSU is assumed to be more powerful than a vehicle, and its communication range is assumed to be
longer. RSUs are distributed in the roadside, and they broadcast
their certificates and the ones of their adjacent RSUs. When Vi
passes by Ri , if Vi is already a member of the current group
that is maintained by Ri , then Ri does nothing. Otherwise, Vi
requests a secret member key from Ri by using the KeyRequest
protocol.
• KeyRequest: This is an interactive protocol run between Vi
and Ri . Vi has private/public keys ξi /pkVi and certificate
CertVi ; Ri has private/public keys ζi /wi and certificate
CertRi . This protocol employs the signcryption scheme
described in [28] and consists of three steps.
1) At this step, Vi takes as input SK, T P , CertVi , and
ξi to generate a signcrypted message and sends the
signcrypted message to Ri . To do this, Vi does the
following.
a) Choose a session key SK.
b) Select a random r ∈ Zq∗ , and compute s = g r , σ =
H1 (SKCertVi T P swi ψ(wir ))ξi , and ϕ =
(SKT P CertVi σ) ⊕ H2 (swi ψ(wir )).
c) Send ρ = (s, ϕ) to Ri .
2) After receiving ρ = (s, ϕ) from Vi , Ri first designcrypts ρ to get the plaintext. It checks the validity
of the signature and the certificate in the plaintext. If
they are valid, a secure channel between Ri and Vi is
opened. Through this secure channel, a secret member
key will be returned to Vi . The concrete procedure is as
follows.
a) Compute the plaintext (SKT P CertVi σ) =
ϕ ⊕ H2 (swi sζi ).
b) Check the validity of CertVi . If it is invalid,
"abort"; otherwise, extract pkVi from CertVi .
?

Verify the signature by checking e(σ, g2 ) =
e(H1 (SKCertVi T P swi sζi ), pkVi ). If the
check is satisfied, using ζi , generate a tuple
(1/ζ +θ )
(ηi , θi ): select θi ∈ Zq∗ , and set ηi = g1 i i .
Otherwise, "abort."
d) Compute κ = ESK((TP ηiθi)) and send κ to Vi .
e) Store (CertVi , ηi ) to Ri ’s database.
3) When Vi receives κ from Ri , it computes
(T P ηi θi ) = DSK (κ). If T P = T P , Vi accepts the
secret member key (ηi , θi ), where T P is the timestamp
that is used by Vi in the first step.
Note that, to further enhance the anonymity of a vehicle and
reduce the frequency of interaction between vehicles and RSUs,
we can let several seriate RSUs (e.g., all the RSUs along the
same street) to share the same private/public key.
3) Re-Key Issuance: A vehicle Vi can revoke its certificate
CertVi for several reasons, e.g., when its private key has been
stolen. If this happens, to ensure the security of the VANET,
the RSUs whose databases contain CertVi should update their
private/public keys, as well as their certificates. Specifically, if
an RSU Ri finds that there is a certificate CertVi on the CRL
c)

and (CertVj , ηj ) on Ri ’s database such that CertVi = CertVj ,
Ri runs the following ReKey protocol.
• ReKey: This protocol consists of the following steps.
1) Ri first runs RKeyGen to generate a new private/public
key pair ζi /wi and the corresponding certificate
CertRi . After this step, the public key of the group
maintained by Ri is updated to wi .
2) Then, Ri broadcasts within its communication range
its new certificate and a lifetime (during this lifetime,
both the new certificate and the old certificate of Ri are
considered valid).
3) When a vehicle Vi receives the above messages from
Ri , it should launch the KeyRequest protocol that is
used in the Key Issuance stage to request a fresh secret member key corresponding to the new public key
wi of Ri .
4) Signing: As mentioned above, if a vehicle directly
broadcasts a message M (in this paper, M = Group ID
PayloadTimestamp) with no secure mechanism, VANETs may
suffer from some serious attacks. To avoid or detect those
attacks and simultaneously protect the privacy of users, we use
the group signature scheme proposed by Ferrara et al. [34].
Before sending a message M , Vi first signs it by using the
following VBSign algorithm.
• VBSign: Let (ηi θi ) be Vi ’s secret member key. Vi computes the group signature πVi on M as follows.
1) Randomly select α, β ∈ Zq∗ and compute
⎧
T1 = u α
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ T2 = v β
T3 = ηi h(α+β)
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ γ1 = θi α
γ2 = θi β.
2) Select rα , rβ , rθ , rγ1 , rγ2 ∈ Zq∗ at random and
compute

⎧
R1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ R2
R3
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ R4
R5

= u rα
= v rβ
= e(T3 , g2 )rθ e(h, wi )−rα −rβ e(h, g2 )−rγ1 −rγ2
= T1rθ u−rγ1
= T2rθ v −γ2 .

3) Compute c = H3 (M, T1 , T2 , T3 , R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 , R5 ).
4) Compute
⎧ s = r + cα
α
α
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ sβ = rβ + cβ
sθ = rθ + cθi
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ sγ1 = rγ1 + cγ1
sγ2 = rγ2 + cγ2 .
5) Output
the
group
signature
πVi =
(T1 , T2 , T3 , R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 , R5 , sα , sβ , sθ , sγ1 , sγ2 ).
5) Batch Verification: A vehicle may receive many safetyrelated messages from other vehicles in a very short time.
Before accepting these safety messages, it should first verify
their validity by checking the signatures of the safety messages.
As remarked in [36], fast validation of vehicular messages is
crucial for a wide deployment of VANETs in practice. To meet
this requirement, we use a batch-verification technique similar
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to the one shown in [36] and [37]. When a vehicle receives
safety messages from other vehicles in the group maintained
by Ri whose public key is wi , it runs the following VBVerify
algorithm to check the validity of these safety messages.
• VBVerify: Assume that a vehicle should verify n safety
messages at the same time. Let πj = (T1,j , T2,j , T3,j ,
R1,j , R2,j , R3,j , R4,j , R5,j , sα,j , sβ,j , sθ,j , sγ1 ,j , sγ2 , j )
be the signature on the message Mj in the jth safety
message. For each j = 1, . . . , n, first compute
cj = H3 (Mj , T1,j , T2,j , T3,j , R1,j , R2,j , R3,j , R4,j , R5,j )
and take random width-w nonadjacent forms (w-NAFs,
[37]) δ1 , . . . , δn . Batch verify the following bilinear-mapbased equation:
⎞
⎛
n
n


s δ
δj ?
−c δ
T3,jθ,j j h(−sγ1 ,j −sγ2 ,j )δj g1 j j , g2 ⎠
R3,j
= e⎝
j=1

j=1

⎛
· e⎝

n


⎞
h(−sα,j −sβ,j )δj T3 j

c δj

, wi ⎠ .

j=1

Then, verify the validity of the following nonbilinear map
equations:
⎧
?
c
⎪
usθ,j = T1,jj
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ sβ,j ? cj
v
= T2,j R2,j
sθ,j −sγ ,j ?
⎪
T1,j u 1 = R4,j
⎪
⎪
⎪
?
⎩ T sθ,j v −sγ2 ,j =
R5,j
2,j
by picking random w-NAFs [37] 1,1 , . . . , 1,n ; 2,1 , . . . ,
2,n ; 3,1 , . . . , 3,n ; 4,1 , . . . , 4,n and batch verifying
n
sθ,j 1,j −cj 1,j sβ,j 2,j −cj 2,j − 2,j sθ,j 3,j
T1,j
v
T2,j
R2,j T1,j
j=1 (u
−

s

−

?

u−sγ1 ,j 3,j R4,j3,j T2,jθ,j 4,j v −sγ2 ,j 4,j R5,j4,j ) = 1. Finally,
accept the safety messages if and only if all checks
succeed.
Bilinear map operation is the most time-consuming operation
in the above VBVerify algorithm. Using the batch-verification
technique requires only two (rather than 2n) bilinear map
operations. In addition to saving in bilinear map computation,
the above batch verification performs approximately 4.8 times
faster than the individual verifications [37].
6) Tracing: Malicious entities (vehicles) may exist in
VANETs. They may send fake messages to other vehicles to
influence the traffic. If this happens, the TM can disclose the
identity of the actual sender by invoking the following Open
algorithm.
• Open: This algorithm is used by the TM to trace a signature that is included in a safety message. Let πVi =
(T1 , T2 , T3 , R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 , R5 , sα , sβ , sθ , sγ1 , sγ2 ) be a
valid signature on Mi under an RSU’s public key wi
(according to the group ID in Mi , the TM can download
the public key of the corresponding RSU from the TA).
The TM proceeds as follows.
1) Recover the vehicle’s ηi as ηi = T3 /(T1x · T2y ).
2) Get (CertVi , ηi ) from the RSU’s database.
3) Extract IDVi from CertVi .
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IV. S ECURITY A NALYSIS
Here, we analyze the security of the proposed protocol. We
will show that our protocol meets all the security requirements
described in Section II-B.
We first consider the scenario of a confidential communication between a vehicle and an RSU. It can be divided into two
phases.
• The first is the vehicle-to-RSU communication phase. This
scenario has three security requirements: confidential communication, message authentication, and privacy protection. In this phase, a vehicle Vi that wants to join a group
maintained by Ri first selects a session key, generates a
ciphertext ρ by using a signcryption scheme that takes as
input the session key, a timestamp T P , etc., and then, Vi
sends ρ to Ri . Since the signcryption scheme we choose
satisfies the message confidentiality, signature unforgeability, and ciphertext anonymity properties that provide
confidential communication, message authentication, and
privacy protection, respectively, it is easy to see that the
communications in this phase meet the desired security
requirements in VANETs.
• The second phase is the RSU-to-vehicle communication.
This scenario also has three security requirements: confidential communication, message authentication, and privacy protection. In this phase, Ri first extracts the secret
member key (ηi , θi ) for Vi , then uses the session key
SK received from Vi and the symmetric-key encryption
algorithm ESK (·) to encrypt (T P ηi θi ) and get the
ciphertext κ, and finally sends the ciphertext κ to Vi . Since
only Vi knows the corresponding session key, only Vi can
decrypt (T P ηi θi ) from κ. Therefore, the confidential
communication requirement is guaranteed. Furthermore,
the session key is only used once. Hence, privacy protection is also satisfied. After getting (T P ηi θi ), Vi
?

checks T P = T P . This is used to fulfill the messageauthentication requirement.
Finally, we turn to the V2V communication scenario. The
security requirements of message authentication, privacy protection, and anonymity revocability should hold in this scenario.
Here, the group signature scheme is used in our protocol, and
the group signature has the unforgeability, unlinkability, and
traceability properties, which ensure message authentication,
privacy protection, and anonymity revocability, respectively.
Hence, the desired security requirements for this scenario are
naturally fulfilled.
V. P ERFORMANCE E VALUATION
Here, we evaluate the performance of our protocol by comparing it with the up-to-date protocols GSIS [16] and efficient
conditional privacy preservation (ECPP) [20], which offer similar security and privacy properties.
A. Transmission Overhead of Safety Messages
According to DSRC [8], a vehicle sends each message with
a time interval from 100 to 300 ms, and the minimal data rate in
DSRC is 6 Mb/s (for safety messaging, it is typically 12 Mb/s).
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TABLE II
RSU S ERVICE E FFICIENCY

In the following, we will consider two scenarios. Our analyses
show that our protocol is practical in both scenarios.
First, we consider a six-lane two-way highway, each lane
being 3 m wide. We assume uniform presence of vehicles, with
an intervehicle space of 30 m. Vehicles are in movement and
transmit DSRC safety messages every 300 ms over a 300-m
communication range. According to [5], a vehicle can hear at
most 120 vehicles per 300 ms, which amounts to a system
throughput of 1.45 Mb/s [(120 × 3.33 × 474 × 8)/(1024 ×
1024) Mb/s]. This throughput is much smaller than 6 Mb/s.
Second, we consider the same highway, but this time, vehicles are very slow or even stopped (i.e., a congestion scenario).
The vehicles are separated by 5 m (including the vehicle
length). Each vehicle transmits a safety message over a range
of 15 m every 100 ms. In the worst case [5], a vehicle can
hear at most 36 other vehicles per 100 ms. Hence, we have the
maximal throughput 1.30 Mb/s [(36 × 10 × 474 × 8)/(1024 ×
1024) Mb/s], which is also smaller than the minimum bandwidth available of 6 Mb/s.
B. RSU Service Efficiency
Here, we compare the RSU service efficiency (the cost for
a vehicle to receive a secret member key or a short-time
anonymous certificate from an RSU) of our protocol with the
ECPP protocol.
According to the execution time results shown in [38], the
measured processing time5 for one bilinear map operation τm
is about 4.5 ms, and the time for one point exponentiation τe is
about 0.6 ms. In the sequel, we denote by TV the computation
overhead of a vehicle and by TR the computation overhead of
an RSU.
From Table II, regarding the computational cost, we can find
that the RSU service efficiency of our protocol is slightly better
than the efficiency of the ECPP protocol in [20]. In addition,
our protocol is round efficient. To obtain a secret member key
from an RSU, our protocol requires only one round, whereas
the ECPP requires two rounds (for a short-time anonymous
certificate). A two-round protocol causes more delays than a
single-round one. Sometimes, a vehicle may pass by an RSU at
a very high speed. Hence, if a two-round protocol is used, the
vehicle may not receive the secret member key or the short-time
anonymous certificate in time.
C. Computation Overhead on Signature Verification
Here, we compare the computational overhead of signature
verification in our protocol with that in ECPP and GSIS (V2V
communication scenario).
5 For a Miyaji, Nakabayashi, and Takano (MNT) curve [39] of embedding
degree k = 6 and 160-bit q and an implementation run on an Intel Pentium IV
3.0-GHz machine.

Fig. 4.

Time-efficiency ratio T 1 = To /TE and T 2 = To /TG .

With our protocol, to verify n safety messages (essentially, to
verify n signatures in n safety messages) from the same group,
the required time cost is
To = 2τm +

14n × 0.6
14nτe
= 2 × 4.5 +
ms.
4.8
4.8

Generally, a vehicle may receive safety messages from at most
two groups. The required time cost to verify n safety messages
from two different groups is
To = 4τm +

14n × 0.6
14nτe
= 4 × 4.5 +
ms.
4.8
4.8

With ECPP, to verify n safety messages, the time cost is
TE = 3nτm + 11nτe = 3n × 4.5 + 11n × 0.6 ms. With GSIS,
the time cost of verifying n safety messages increases with the
number of revoked certificates of vehicles in the revocation
list. It is fair to compare our protocol with GSIS when the
revocation list is empty. In this case, the computational time
of signature verification of GSIS is TG = 5nτm + 12nτe =
5n × 4.5 + 11n × 0.6 ms. Fig. 4 shows the time-cost ratio
T 1 = To /TE and T 2 = To /TG . Fig. 5 shows the time-cost
ratio T 3 = To /TE and T 4 = To /TG .
From Figs. 4 and 5, it is apparent that the computational
overhead of the signature verification of our protocol is always
much lower than that in [16] and [20]. This advantage of our
protocol is more obvious when the number of vehicles within
the communication range grows. In VANETs, vehicles broadcast safety messages every 100–300 ms to other vehicles. This
way, a vehicle may receive lots of safety messages from other
vehicles in a very short period of time. Hence, the efficiency of
the signature verification is vital when the number of vehicles
within the communication range is high. In [16], the group
signature can only be verified one by one, whereas in [20],
before verifying a signature from a vehicle, one should first
verify the short-time anonymous certificate of the vehicle. In
contrast, in our protocol, no short-time anonymous certificates
are required, and the batch-verification technique is used. This
largely improves the efficiency of our signature verification.
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Fig. 7. Impact of authentication on the message delay.

the sample district in the simulation, LD is the number of
vehicles in D, M → is the number of messages sent by vehicle ,
K is the number of vehicles within a one-hop communication
Fig. 5.

Fig. 6.

Time-efficiency ratio T 3 = To /TE and T 4 = To /TG .

Road scenario corresponding to a square area of size 1 × 1 km2 .

D. Simulation
Here, by using NS-2 [40], we carry out some simulations
to evaluate the average message delay and message loss rate
to determine the practical performance of our protocol. In our
simulations, the road scenario that is considered covers an
area of 1 × 1 km2 and is shown in Fig. 6. The vehicles were
generated at random, and their average speed was 56 km/h,
which is typical in urban areas. The communication range of
each vehicle is from 10 to 300 m. The channel bandwidth bound
is 6 Mb/s, and the packet size is 474 B (see Section III-B). For
each experiment, the simulation time is 200 s. In addition, since
the communication range of an RSU is much longer than the
one of a vehicle, for most cases, a vehicle only verifies safety
messages from the members in the same on-the-fly group. As
shown in Section V-C, to verify n safety messages, the required
time cost is To = 2 × 4.5 + (14n × 0.6/4.8) ms.
The average message delay Dmsg is defined as fol
M  →
m
→
lows [36]: Dmsg = (1/LD )
m=1 (Tsgn +
∈D ((1/M → )
 
 M AD/τ
mk
→
(1/K ) K
jPm,j τ ))), where D is
j=1
k=1 (Ttrnsmsn +

m

→
range of vehicle , Tsgn
is the time taken by vehicle  to sign
mk

→
message m, Ttrnsmsn
is the time taken to transmit message
m from vehicle  to vehicle k, τ is the time period taken
to perform a batch verification, and M AD is the maximum
allowable delay for end-to-end message transmissions. According to [41], M AD is 100 ms. Pm,j = vm,j /Vm , where Vm
is the total number of vehicles processing m among the K
vehicles, and vm,j is the number of vehicles processing m in
the interval
 ((j − 1)τ, jτ ] for jτ ≤ M AD. Clearly, we have
Vm = vm,j .
The average message delay Dmsg reflects the average time
latency for a message to be processed and must be smaller
than M AD. Fig. 7 shows the relationship between Dmsg , the
vehicle density, and the batch-verification period τ . From this
figure, one can see that, for a fixed vehicle density, Dmsg
increases with τ . For a fixed τ , in the case of a very low density,
Dmsg sharply grows when the vehicle density is increased from
10/km2 to 30/km2 . However, the delay stabilizes for vehicle
densities above 30/km2 . These experimental results seem to
contradict the intuition that the delay will keep increasing as
more messages will be received for verification. We observe
that such a stable curve is due to the fact that most received
messages can be verified in a batch, and the average message
delay does not increasingly grow for a larger density. We also
note that, for all combinations of different densities and batchverification intervals, the average message delay is lower than
M AD = 100 ms, which implies that our protocol works well
for various traffic environments.
When the arriving messages surpass the processing capacity
of the vehicle in a batch-verification period, some messages
cannot be verified, which results in message loss due to the authentication mechanism. The average message loss (introduced
by cryptographic operations) rate can be computed as follows:

Rloss = 1 −

1  nτ
LD
nvi
vi ∈D

where nτ is the maximum number of messages that a vehicle
can verify in a given batch period τ , and nvi is the number of
messages that a vehicle vi receives to verify in a given batch
period τ . If nvi ≤ nτ , then nτ /nvi = 1.
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Fig. 8. Impact of authentication on the message loss rate.

Fig. 8 shows that, when τ = 0.02 and 0.03 s, Rloss increases
as the vehicle density grows, and when τ ≥ 0.04 s, Rloss is
almost 0 for a density between 0/km2 and 120/km2 . This is
because when τ is small, only a few messages are received in a
batch period, and the advantage of batch verification is not well
exploited; when τ and the vehicle density grow, the messages
received in τ also grow. However, the arriving message growth
rate cannot surpass the message processing capacity, which also
grows with τ .
From the results illustrated in Figs. 7 and 8, one may find
that there is a conflict between the average message delay Dmsg
and the average message loss rate Rloss . We expect low average
message delay, as lower latency implies that vehicles can take
less time to respond to the traffic environment changes. To obtain lower average message delay, the batch-verification interval
τ should be as small as possible. However, if τ is too small,
some messages cannot be verified, and the average message
loss rate grows. Hence, a balance point has to be found, and
from Figs. 7 and 8, τ = 0.05 s might be an ideal balance point.
VI. C ONCLUSION
A number of challenges such as efficient certificate distribution and revocation, avoidance of computation and communication bottlenecks, and reduction of the strong dependence
on tamper-proof devices arise in existing protocols for securing
VANETs. We have proposed a new privacy-preserving authentication protocol that efficiently addresses those challenges by
considering the special features of vehicular mobility, road
limitations, and densely distributed RSUs in VANETs. In our
system, each RSU maintains an on-the-fly-generated group
within its communication range in which vehicles can anonymously generate V2V messages and verify anonymous V2V
messages from other vehicles. Vehicles generating false/bogus
messages can be traced by a third party. Our scheme has been
shown to be robust, scalable, and practical. Furthermore, it
clearly outperforms state-of-the-art alternatives in the case of
dense traffic.
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simulation. The authors are with the UNESCO Chair in Data
Privacy, but their views do not necessarily reflect the position of
the UNESCO nor make any commitments for that organization.

[1] L. Wischhof, A. Ebner, and H. Rohling, “Information dissemination in
self-organizing intervehicle networks,” IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.,
vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 90–101, Mar. 2005.
[2] P. Karger and Y. Frankel, “Security and privacy threats to ITS,” in Proc.
2nd World Congr. Intell. Transp. Syst., 1995, vol. 5, pp. 2452–2458.
[3] A. Solanas, J. Domingo-Ferrer, and A. Martínez-Ballesté, “Location privacy in location-based services: Beyond TTP-based schemes,” in Proc.
1st Int. Workshop PiLBA, 2008, pp. 12–23.
[4] A. Solanas and A. Martínez-Ballesté, “A TTP-free protocol for location
privacy in location-based services,” Comput. Commun., vol. 31, no. 6,
pp. 1181–1191, Apr. 2008.
[5] M. Raya and J. Hubaux, “Securing vehicular ad hoc networks,” J.
Comput. Secur., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 39–68, Jan. 2007.
[6] Car 2 Car Communication Consortium. [Online]. Available: http://www.
car-to-car.org/
[7] IEEE Trial-Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments,
IEEE Std. 1609.2-2006, 2006.
[8] Dedicated Short Range Communications (DRSC) Home. [Online].
Available: http://www.leearmstrong.com/Dsrc/DSRCHomeset.htm
[9] National ITS Architecture. [Online]. Available: http://www.iteris.com/
itsarch/index.htm
[10] V. Daza, J. Domingo-Ferrer, F. Sebé, and A. Viejo, “Trustworthy privacypreserving car-generated announcements in vehicular ad hoc networks,”
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 1876–1886, May 2009.
[11] M. Raya, A. Aziz, and J.-P. Hubaux, “Efficient secure aggregation in
VANETs,” in Proc. 3rd Int. Workshop VANET, 2006, pp. 67–75.
[12] M. Raya and J. Hubaux, “The security of vehicular ad hoc networks,” in
Proc. 3rd ACM Workshop SASN, 2005, pp. 11–21.
[13] J. Blum and A. Eskandarian, “The threat of intelligent collisions,” IT
Prof., vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 24–29, Jan. 2004.
[14] L. Gollan and C. Meinel, “Digital signatures for automobiles, Institut für Telematik e.V, Trier, Germany, Tech. Rep., 2002. [Online].
Available: http://www.hpi.uni-potsdam.de/fileadmin/hpi/FG_ITS/papers/
DigitalSignaturesAuto02.pdf
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